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ABSTRACT: This paper provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing 
against Mark Alfano’s challenges to them based on his theses of inferential cognitive 
situationism and of epistemic situationism. In order to support the claim that credit 
theories can treat many cases of cognitive success through heuristic cognitive strategies 
as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between virtue epistemologies 
qua credit theories, and dual-process theories in cognitive psychology. It also provides a 
response to Lauren Olin and John Doris’ ‘vicious minds’ thesis, and their ‘tradeoff 
problem’ for virtue theories. A genuine convergence between virtue epistemology and 
dual-process theory is called for, while acknowledging that this effort may demand new 
and more empirically well-informed projects on both sides of the division between 
Conservative virtue epistemology (including the credit theory of knowing) and 
Autonomous virtue epistemology (including projects for providing guidance to 
epistemic agents). 
KEYWORDS: bounded rationality, dual-process theory, ecological rationality, 
heuristic reasoning, situationism, virtue epistemology  
 
1. The Great Rationality Debate 
One goal of this paper is to defend virtue epistemology (hereafter VE) against a 
number of charges that Mark Alfano brings against it based upon the 
incompatibility of its claims with epistemic situationism, and that Lauren Olin and 
John Doris bring against it based upon an objection we can call the ‘trade-off’ 
problem.1 The latter problem alleges a dilemma in the form of a necessary tradeoff 
with ill-consequences for VE, a trade-off between the normative appeal of a 
virtue-theoretic (ability) condition on knowing, and the empirical adequacy of 
such a condition. Doris presented a short version of the trade-off problem in his 
                                                                
1 Mark Alfano, Character as Moral Fiction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); 
Lauren Olin and John M. Doris, “Vicious Minds,” Philosophical Studies 168, 3 (2014): 665-692; 
John Doris, Lack of Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
Guy Axtell 
8 
critique of virtue ethics in Lack of Character; Olin and Doris develop the problem, 
extending it into a challenge for virtue epistemologies as well. 
At the same time, however, the paper will have more constructive goals 
than that of defending VE against the challenge of philosophical situationists and 
their close cousins. Epistemologists have not paid enough attention to what 
psychologists call the normative-descriptive gap, or to the ‘bounded’ or ‘ecological’ 
nature of human cognition. Our human susceptibilities to motivational and 
cognitive biases may be well-recognized by today’s more naturalistically-inclined 
philosophers. But there remains a worry about normative theories in ethics and 
epistemology, shared by many in the social scientific community, which must be a 
concern for virtue theories as well: philosophers must be warned of repeating the 
errors of the past by permitting discussions of ethical and epistemic normativity to 
continue as a ‘separate culture’ from the social and cognitive sciences. As Appiah 
puts the point, “The questions we put to the social scientists and physiologists are 
not normative questions. But their answers are not therefore irrelevant to 
normative questions.”2  
Naturalistic virtue theory agrees: It is a dubious non-naturalism in 
philosophy, and in particular an intellectualist tradition associated with the 
autonomy of philosophy from the human and natural sciences, that motivates the 
separate cultures notion. Virtue theories have arguably been at the forefront of the 
movement to integrate the scientific image of humans into normative ethics and 
epistemology. But my approach suggests that much more attention needs to be 
paid by ethicists and epistemologists both to the normative-descriptive gap and 
more particularly to how to conceive the relationships between ‘reasoning and 
thinking,’ ‘competence and performance,’ and ‘assessment and guidance.’ In terms 
of positions in the great debate over human rationality which has raged over the 
past half-century, I will try to show virtue theorists as Meliorists standing against 
the situationist’s Skepticism. But avoiding the traps of intellectualism and the 
philosophy-as-autonomy view also means distancing one’s stance from those 
proponents of the Apologist and Panglossian positions who Daniel Kahneman 
chastised decades ago as acknowledging only two categories of errors, “pardonable 
errors by subjects and unpardonable ones by psychologists.”3  
                                                                
2 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Experiments in Ethics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 
62. 
3 Daniel Kahneman quoted from Keith Stanovich and Richard West, “Individual Differences in 
Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?” in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of 
Intuitive Judgment, eds. Thomas Gilovich, Dale W. Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 421.  
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Let us be somewhat clearer about what will be the critical and constructive 
goals of the paper. On the critical side I take the approach of empirical rebuttal 
and argue that Alfano’s two key theses, which he terms inferential cognitive 
situationist (ICS) and epistemic situationist (ES) (sections 2 and 3, below) are 
generalizations that are not strongly supported by the selection of studies in 
cognitive and social psychology (respectively) he bases them on. Generalization as 
a form of inductive arguments is assessed as either strong or weak, and weak 
inductive arguments are akin to invalid deductive arguments in falling short of 
logical compulsion. If such generalizations as philosophical situationism depends 
upon are not as strong or cogent as they claim, then of course they do not provide 
a benchmark (as their challenges assume) against which the empirical adequacy of 
an epistemology should be measured. Sections 2 and 3 respond to challenges 
directed against the more reliabilist and the more responsibilist versions of VE, 
respectively. But my weak generalization claim about the status of Alfano’s two 
key theses regarding human cognitive agency also extends to Olin and Doris’ 
‘vicious mind’ thesis. These authors claim to infer from their discussion of select 
studies to the ‘enormous’ variability in human cognitive functioning due to our 
sensitivity to even slight situational variables. Section 4 offers a fuller response to 
their ‘trade-off’ problem for virtue theories than I have previously given, allowing 
me a chance to more fully develop the Narrow-Broad Spectrum of Agency-
Ascriptions I alluded to in an earlier exchange.4 
On the constructive side, I concede that few extant versions of VE have 
tried explicitly to square themselves with bounded rationality, or with dual-
process theory (hereafter DPT), as I will argue that they should. Indeed, there has 
been more work on accommodating DPT among ethicists than among 
epistemologists.5 Bounded rationality, extending from seminal work by Herbert 
Simon, asks and studies how real people make decisions with limited time, 
information, and computation. Gerd Gigerenzer writes that the science of 
                                                                
4 Guy Axtell, “Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology,” in Virtue and Vice, Moral and 
Epistemic, ed. Heather Battaly (Oxford: Wiley/Broadview Press), 73-94. See also Christopher 
Lepock, “Unifying the Intellectual Virtues,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Inquiry 83, 1 
(2011): 106-128. 
5 Daniel Lapsley and Patrick Hill, “On Dual Processing and Heuristic Approaches to Moral 
Cognition,” Journal of Moral Education 37, 3 (2008): 313-332; Holly M. Smith, “Dual-Process 
Theory and Moral Responsibility,” in The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays, eds. 
Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 176-208; Nancy Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence: An Empirically Grounded Theory 
(London: Routledge, 2009); Snow, “Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity,” Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 9, 5 (2006): 545-561.  
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heuristics “Asserts that ecologically valid decisions often do not require exhaustive 
analysis of all causal variables or an analysis of all possible actions – and – 
consequences. The best decisions do not always result from such effortful, 
reflective, calculations, but instead rely on ‘frugal,’ incomplete and truncated 
inquiry.”6 Ecological rationality challenges expectations that human reasoners are 
rational or justified only when they meet normative standards derived 
independently of empirical and social psychology. It suggests that demands upon 
rationality be perfectly feasible for agents, computationally speaking, and that 
norms of epistemic assessment, while still truth connected, not be ‘free-floating’ 
impositions.7 That cognition is so heavily ecological means that norms of epistemic 
rationality and responsibility bump up against pragmatic constraints and inborn 
limitations in ways that challenge ideal observer and maximizing conceptions of 
reasoning.8  
Gigerenzer’s approach has substantial differences from those versions of 
ecological rationality that I want to highlight in this paper, versions that fall under 
the umbrella term of dual process theories. No less a pioneer of the biases and 
heuristics studies than Daniel Kahneman notes that “Tversky and I always thought 
of the heuristics and biases approach as a two-process theory.”9 What he describes 
in his recent book Thinking, Fast and Slow as ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ thinking 
(hereafter T1/T2) merely modifies terms he acknowledges were introduced first by 
Keith Stanovich, Richard West and Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, whose work we will 
focus on in the next section.  
                                                                
6 Gerd Gigerenzer, Ecological Rationality: Intelligence in the World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 20. 
7 See Rysiew’s helpful conditions on psychology-sensitive philosophical norms of rationality, in 
Patrick Rysiew, “Rationality Disputes – Psychology and Epistemology,” Philosophy Compass 3, 
6 (2008): 1153-1176. 
8 Gigerenzer sees the facts of ecological rationality challenging what he terms the ‘classical 
conception of rationality,’ a conception with ‘appealing but often unrealistic goals’ that he 
thinks is anti-naturalistic in its tenor yet remains still deeply-rooted in philosophy, economics, 
and decision theory. The standard view in the cognitive sciences associated with unbounded 
rationality Gigerenzer blames for the institutionalized division of labor between principles 
based upon the ‘is’ and ‘ought' division. “Until recently, the study of cognitive heuristics has 
been seen as a solely descriptive enterprise, explaining how people actually make decisions. The 
study of logic and probability, by contrast, has been seen as answering the normative question of 
how one should make decisions.” (Gigerenzer, Ecological Rationality, 496). This split or schism 
Gigerenzer thinks has served to wrongly elevate logic and probability above heuristics; the 
result is “contrasting the pure and rational way people should reason with the dirty and 
irrational way people in fact do reason.” 
9 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2012). 
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Since few attempts have already been made to square virtue theory with 
ecological rationality or with dual-process theory, this paper is one with 
prescriptive implications for the direction of epistemological research. My title 
should be taken to reflect the idea that virtue theorists both in ethics and 
epistemology do indeed need to think twice if their appeal to person-level abilities 
and to characterological concepts more generally is to be empirically-informed 
and naturalistically sound. Adapting Evans’ book title Thinking Twice: Two Minds 
in One Brain (2010),10 the real and direct challenge to virtue epistemologists as I 
conceive it, is to rethink the epistemic credit-related family of concepts in light of 
the distinction between (T1) fast, automatic, holistic, and intuitive ways of 
thinking that require relatively little cognitive effort, and (T2) slow, deliberative, 
and serial or analytic ones that require substantially more sustained cognitive 
effort [see Table 1 reprinted from Evans and Stanovich].11 Thinking fast/frugally 
and slow/effortfully are both adaptive; both are routinely successful, although 
both can also fail. But far too often an effortful, maximizing conception of 
rationality has been taken as paradigmatic, with heuristic reasoning viewed only 
as a source of error and dysrationalia. So my thesis of possible convergences 
between normative epistemology and DPT prescribes substantial rethinking on 
the part of epistemologists, including proponents of VE. 
 
                                                                
10 Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Thinking Twice: Two Minds in One Brain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
11 Reprinted from Jonathan St. B.T. Evans and Keith Stanovich, “Dual Process Theories of 
Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 8, 3 (2013): 
223-242, 224. 
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2. Abilities, Heuristic Reasoning, and Epistemic Credit 
In his book Character as Moral Fiction and papers leading up to it, Mark Alfano 
poses the following dilemma for reliabilist and mixed virtue epistemologies:  
First Horn: If they say that heuristics are not intellectual virtues, skepticism 
looms: If most people use non-virtuous heuristics, then most people have a large 
number of unjustified beliefs, which do not count as knowledge.  
Second Horn: If, however, they say that heuristics are intellectual virtues, then 
they need to explain how these dispositions are to be construed as reliable.  
The dilemma tries to force a choice between holding absolutely either that 
heuristic reasoning is or isn’t virtuous. Virtue epistemologists do not want to set 
conditions on knowledge so high that knowledge becomes scarce. But embracing 
the second horn Alfano thinks is barred by the thesis of inferential cognitive 
situationism (ICS): 
(ICS) People acquire and retain most of their inferential beliefs through 
heuristics rather than intellectual virtues.12  
Arguably, there is a problem with Alfano’s statement of the problem since 
(ICS), by presupposing that heuristics are not virtues (the either/or language of 
‘rather than’) begs the question against someone who wants to ‘grab the second 
horn’ of the dilemma. But more charitably, since all of Alfano’s and Olin and 
Doris’ challenges focus specifically around the aretaic or ability condition that 
credit (or achievement) theories13 place upon knowledge possession, I will 
construe the demand for clarity about the status of heuristics to be about whether 
virtue epistemologists can accommodate them in a credit theory of knowing. If 
knowledge is an achievement creditable in significant measure to an agent’s 
manifestation of ability/virtue, how can inferences that apply heuristic reasoning 
instead of patterns that we recognize as sound and reliable inferential practice, 
count as virtuous? 
The issue Alfano raises is indeed important, but the demand he places upon 
reliabilist and mixed VE seems to me a false dichotomy, so I will go ‘Between the 
Horns’ of his dilemma in reply. For Alfano’s dilemma clearly takes ‘heuristics’ and 
‘cognitive virtues related to deductive and inductive reasoning’ out of context 
from bounded rationality theories. Although bringing concern with heuristic 
reasoning to the forefront of epistemology can be applauded as likely to spur 
                                                                
12 Alfano, Character as Moral Fiction, 201 and 191. 
13 I here take ‘credit theory’ as a general type of analysis broad enough to include both Robust 
and Anti-luck VE. 
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progress in the field, virtue epistemologists can surely avail themselves of leading 
theories in cognitive psychology, theories on which it would be absurd a demand 
a choice between the reliability or unreliability of heuristic strategies. Cognitive 
and social psychology indeed militates against pitting facts about thinking against 
norms of reasoning in the way that Alfano’s dilemma pits them. To briefly digress, 
DPT and Gigerenzer’s ecological rationality theory have some sharp differences,14 
but it is fundamental to the broader ‘new paradigm’ in cognitive psychology 
which they share that intuitive and reflective thinking can each be highly reliable 
when well-matched to the agent’s problem situation. In Evans’ terms, “both Type 
1 and Type 2 processing can lead to ‘good’ or normative answers.”15 
Although logocentrism, and a deductivist bias, still casts its shadow on 
philosophy’s ways of approaching norm governance, most epistemologists, and I 
think all of those associated with VE, are today concerned with human thinking, 
not just ‘reasoning,’ and with inference, not just ‘argument.’ Concerns with success 
on cognitive tasks through heuristic strategies and T1 processing should indeed 
prompt a more minimal account of epistemic credit than an epistemology could 
offer if it remained locked into understanding reasoning and inference only on the 
model of argument. As Paul Thagard argues, a naturalistic epistemology consistent 
with the successes of ecologically rational agents needs to maintain that 
“rationality should be understood as a matter of making effective inferences, not 
just good arguments.”16 But assumptions that might restrict epistemic credit to the 
                                                                
14 Gigerenzer’s ecological rationality theory finds unmotivated the division into two types, 
systems, or ‘minds,’ arguing instead that intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on 
common principles such that a unitary rather than a dual-process account can be given of them. 
But the overlap of shared lessons from cognitive psychology is nevertheless broad. See Arie W. 
Kruglanski and Gerd Gigerenzer, “Intuitive and Deliberate Judgments are Based on Common 
Principles,” Psychological Review 18, 1 (2011): 97-109.  
15 Jonathan St. B.T. Evans, “Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning: Facts and Fallacies,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning, eds. Keith J. Holyoak and Robert G. Morrison 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 23. See also Evans, “Questions and Challenges for the 
New Psychology of Reasoning,” Thinking & Reasoning 18, 1 (2012): 5-31; David Over, “New 
Paradigm Psychology of Reasoning,” Thinking & Reasoning 15 (2009): 431-438. 
16 Paul Thagard, “Critical Thinking and Informal Logic: Neuropsychological Perspectives,” 
Informal Logic 31, 3 (2011), 152. Manktelow (Thinking and Reasoning) and Over (“The New 
Paradigm”) both discuss how seminal to psychology the gap problem and the distinction 
between reasoning and thinking have been. Compare Thagard, writing as a naturalistic 
epistemologist critiquing the costs of confusing inference and argument: “If inference were the 
same as argument, it would have the same serial, linguistic structure. However, there’s ample 
evidence from cognitive psychology and neuroscience the human inference is actually parallel 
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latter are hardly to be associated with reliabilist VE, where naturalistic orientation 
runs highest. Epistemic credit associated with knowledge-attributions generally 
demands only weak cognitive achievements unless we are talking about 
specifically reflective knowledge. If this is correct then it can credit successes that 
might be easily had in untaxing ways in epistemically friendly environments.17 
One would think that the turn in epistemology from states and standings to 
epistemic agency and inquiry would underline these points. Evans writes, 
From a pragmatic viewpoint, even if people fall prey to certain biases, it does not 
mean they are irrational [or generally unreliable, or ‘vicious’]. Making mistakes 
can still be part of a rational, or a reliable, or an intellectually virtuous agent’s 
repertoire. As some leading dual process psychologists have argued more 
explicitly, errors of thinking occur because of, rather than in spite of, the nature 
of our intelligence. In other words, they are an inevitable consequence of the 
way in which we think and a price to be paid for the extraordinary effectiveness 
with which we routinely deal with the massive information processing 
requirements of everyday life.18 
Another way of putting my point is that having an account of inferential 
knowledge and recognizing virtues connected with sound deduction and 
abduction does not commit epistemologists to what Adam Morton, in his recent 
book Bounded Thinking: Intellectual Virtues for Limited Agents calls an N-theory 
of rationality. N-theories derive their norms independently of ecological 
considerations of time, information, and energy, and so often maintain some 
computationally demanding conception of rationality. Another aspect of the 
appeal of the naturalistic turn in epistemology, which virtue theory provides an 
interpretation of, is that we should not dichotomize (as non-naturalistic theories 
sometimes have) between norms of epistemic assessment and the aim of providing 
agents with guidance. While naturalistic approaches in epistemology will still 
recognize that the normativity of assessment and guidance should be 
distinguished, questions of psychology cannot be treated today as they sometimes 
                                                                                                                                       
rather than serial, multimodal rather than just language-based, and as much emotional as 
cognitive” (Thagard, “Critical Thinking,” 152). 
17 Compare Pritchard, who identifies strong cognitive achievements with overcoming a 
significant obstacle to cognitive success, or with the manifestation of high levels of cognitive 
skill. Weak cognitive successes by contrast are those where it is very easy to attain the relevant 
cognitive success. Here “one will meet the rubric for cognitive achievements pretty easily.” 
(Duncan Pritchard, “Virtue Epistemology and the Epistemology of Education,” Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 47, 2 (2013): 236-247, 240.) 
18 Evans quoted in Robert Sternberg and Talia Ben-Zeev, Complex Cognition: The Psychology of 
Human Thought, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 194. 
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have in the past as merely pragmatic or as only guidance but not assessment-
related.19 By focusing on how our intellectual habits, whether genetically-based or 
acquired, ground our pretentions to knowledge, understanding, or other epistemic 
goods, virtue epistemologies it seems to me bypass the worries about N-theories 
and armchair epistemologies that always demand of agents lots of self-reflection 
and high effort or ‘load-heavy’ cognitive processing.  
It is only when an agent applies a cognitive strategy (such as a heuristic 
pattern of reasoning) outside its known range of reliability, or perhaps where 
System 2 or metacognitive ‘over-ride’ skills and sensitivities were expected of 
virtuous agents but were not manifested, that epistemologists are likely to balk at 
credit for success. In these instances error possibilities are high, and the agent’s 
employed strategy is said to have a low ecological validity. Judgments of these 
sorts may rightly be used to deny epistemic credit (and hence knowledge or 
understanding). Of course, the instances where T2 over-ride failures occur in 
humans are many and not few. Philosophers have not come to grips with what 
Kahneman simply describes as ‘the quirkiness of System 1 and the laziness of 
System 2.’ There are numerous causes of dysrationalia in heuristics and biases task 
experiments that DPT recognizes, including failure to detect the need to override 
a heuristic response, lack of acquired ‘mindware’ available to carry out override, 
and inability for ‘sustained decoupling’ that allows hypothetical reasoning and 
other powerful metacognitive aptitudes to engage.  
To summarize thus far, I think there is ample opportunity to go ‘Between 
the Horns’ of Alfano’s dilemma for reliabilist and mixed virtue epistemologies. No 
one need deny the valuable functions that N-theories serve;20 but neither should a 
credit theory of knowing place the agent under any assumed burden of following 
strategies that maximize cognitive load. VE can and should agree with DPT that,  
Since the fast, automatic, and evolutionarily older system requires little cognitive 
capacity, everyone has the capacity to deal rationally with many reasoning and 
decision making problems that were important in the environment in which we 
evolved. Moreover, since the new, slow, rule-based system can be significantly 
affected by education, there is reason to hope that better educational strategies 
                                                                
19 Michael Bishop, who clearly holds that bounded rationality should deeply impact our 
approach to epistemic normativity, finds that the received internalist notion of responsibility is 
what heuristic reasoning especially challenges. (Michael Bishop, “In Praise of Epistemic 
Irresponsibility: How Lazy and Ignorant Can You Be?” Synthese 122, 1 (2008): 179-208, 179. See 
also Michael Bishop and J.D. Trout, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.) 
20 See Adam Morton, Bounded Thinking: Intellectual Virtues for Limited Agents (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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will improve people’s performance on those problems that the old system was 
not designed to deal with.21  
Situationists are skeptics about character-traits, and so also of the claims 
about individual differences among agents that character-traits help determine. 
But in order to go beyond arguing for a basic consistency of VE with cognitive 
psychology’s recognized continuum between fast and slow, or intuitive and 
reflective ways of processing, I offer reflections on three specific guiding themes 
in the work of Evans and Stanovich that I think point out potential convergences 
between them: 
 
Individual differences. According to proponents of DPT there are few continuous 
individual differences among people with respect to autonomous mind, or Type 1 
processing. We are all energy economizers and want to fit strategies to problems 
ecologically when we can, rather than doing the ‘expensive’ reasoning of ideal 
inquirers qua unbounded reasoners. But they also insist that “the intelligence of 
the new mind is quite variable across individuals.”22 DPT both predicts and finds 
confirmed substantial individual differences in what Stanovich terms ‘rational 
thinking dispositions’ and therefore recognizes “individual differences as essential 
components of heuristics and biases research.”23 The cultivation of general 
intellectual virtues that help attenuate cognitive biases and inappropriate heuristic 
responses strongly overlaps with what Stanovich and his colleagues term the 
cultivation of our fluid rationality. Fluid rationality describes a range of available 
critical reasoning dispositions. Research shows that those who do poorly on 
cognitive task tend to be ‘cognitive misers’ in the way that they process, while 
those who do better than average exhibit a more desirable collaboration between 
their T1 and T2 thinking, and as Stanovich has it [Table 2], between our 
crystalized and fluid rationality. Some of the imperfect but powerful aptitudes 
fluid rationality describes are ‘resistance to miserly information processing,’ and 
‘absence of irrelevant context effects in decision making.’ 
 
 
                                                                
21 Richard Samuels and Stephen Stich, “Rationality and Psychology,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Rationality, eds. Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004): 
279-300. 
22 Evans, Thinking Twice, 209. 
23 See also Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West, and Maggie Toplak, “Individual Differences as 
Essential Components of Heuristics and Biases Research,” in The Science of Reason, eds. Ken 
Manktelow, David Over, and Shira Elqayam (New York: Psychology Press, 2012), 335-396. 
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Table 2. The Conceptual Structure of Rational Thought24 
 
 
                                                                
24 Reprinted from Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West, and Maggie Toplak, “Intelligence and 
Rationality,” in Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence, eds. Robert Sternberg and Scott Barry 
Kaufman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 784-826, 799. 
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Critical reasoning dispositions differ from innate IQ and are trainable. In 
explaining the significant individual differences in cognitive performance that the 
heuristics and biases literature evidences, Stanovich urges us to distinguish 
intelligence from rationality in order to give the proper share to each. For 
instance, intelligence tests miss much; the magnitude of the myside bias in 
individuals shows very little relation to intelligence, and avoiding it is one of 
numerous rational thinking skills that are not assessed by IQ. “[I]ntelligence and 
rationality occupy different conceptual locations in models of cognition,”25 and 
must be measured using different tasks and operations. Individual differences in 
biases and heuristics tasks are “more related to rationality than intelligence.”26 
Measures of rational thinking dispositions are positively correlated with normative 
performance on tasks and often predict unique outcomes. Of course motivational 
factors are already in play when we speak of rational thinking dispositions. As 
Evans explains,  
For the kinds of problems where reflective reasoning is required, you also need 
to have the disposition to apply effortful reasoning, rather than to rely on 
intuitions and feelings. This disposition is partly a matter of personality, but is 
also influenced by culture and context.27  
So it is very important from a virtue-theoretic perspective that Stanovich 
describes many response differences as stemming from differences such as these 
rather than what IQ tests test for:  
[M]ost importantly, IQ is a resource that you have to apply to a problem for it to 
be of any use to you… so one cause of dysrationalia is that while a person of high 
IQ could reason well, they're actually failing to engage their reflective abilities. 
Instead, they are inclined by their personality or circumstances to rely on gut 
feelings and intuitions, to be strongly influenced by prior beliefs (which may be 
false) or prone to social influences by peers (who might not be bright).28 
So central is this distinction between intelligence and rationality to 
Stanovich’s version of DPT that he quite recently makes a ‘tripartite proposal’ on 
which Type 2 reasoning subdivides into the algorithmic mind and the reflective 
mind. This subdivision captures the platitude that being intelligent does not 
                                                                
25 Research shows “there is a positive correlation between IQ and rational thinking, but it is 
relatively modest in size…people vary not only in their cognitive ability but also in their 
disposition to think critically about problems they face…” (Keith Stanovich, Rationality and the 
Reflective Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 206). 
26 Stanovich, Rationality and the Reflective Mind, 206. 
27 Evans, Thinking Twice, 210. 
28 Stanovich, Rationality and the Reflective Mind, 206. 
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guarantee being smart [see Table 3]. If you lack the required critical reasoning 
dispositions or mindware, you will find it hard to escape Type 1 intuitive, 
heuristic responses, even if highly intelligent.  
Table 3. The tripartite structure and the locus of individual differences29 
 
Meliorism and a balance of inner and outer. VE and DPT motivate a moderately 
‘Meliorist’30 position in what Stanovich and West call the Great Rationality 
Debate. Meliorism contrasts with overtly Skeptical automaticity, ‘vicious mind,’ or 
situationist claims on the one hand, and Apologist/Panglossian views on the other. 
Stanovich writes that, “What has been ignored in the Great Rationality Debate is 
individual differences,” something which he cites as devaluing the Meliorist 
position that proponents of DPT support. Skeptics and Panglossians share an 
unfounded bent towards underestimating or ignoring the degree of difference 
                                                                
29 Reprinted from Keith Stanovich, “On the Distinction between Rationality and Intelligence: 
Implications for Understanding Individual Differences in Reasoning,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Thinking and Reasoning, 352.  
30 See especially Stanovich, West and Toplak, “Intelligence and Rationality”; and Stanovich and 
West, “On the Relative Independence of Thinking Biases and Cognitive Ability,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 94 (2008): 672-695. 
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found in subject responses in the heuristics and biases studies. Melioristic attitudes 
of piecemeal improvability of human reasoners are made more plausible by the 
family of dual processing theories. The point is not unrelated to how Nancy Snow 
concedes that virtues “might start out by being local,” while holding that “they 
need not remain so,” and how making knowledge and skills chronically accessible 
through training and habituation is often possible.31 Kahneman and Frederick for 
example explore how “complex cognitive operations eventually migrate from 
System 2 to System 1 as proficiency and skill are acquired.”32 The automation or 
chronic accessibility of what was once a slow, effortful process he illustrates 
through the ability of chess masters to very quickly and without great effort assess 
the merit of chess moves. 
Relatedly, Meliorists are generally moderate in respect to how to improve 
cognitive performance, balancing what might be termed cognitive change and 
environmental change. DPT’s prescriptive upshot is that of a balance of “teachable 
reasoning strategies and environmental fixes”; improve the environment where 
that helps to improve rationality, and improve individual skills and competences 
directly through practice and education.33 Skeptics about character by contrast 
criticize character education efforts. In discussing the prescriptive upshot of (ES), 
Alfano proposes retaining virtue-talk in education primarily as something of a 
motivational white lie that can enhance short–term cognitive performance 
primarily by raising the effect of mood. Doris’ conclusion in Lack of Character still 
more pessimistically suggests turning away from attempts to develop pedagogy for 
integrated character to something like enlightened situation-management.34  
In summary, DPT highlights an empirically well-grounded balance between 
the inner and the outer. It explains the complex interactions necessary for the 
successful exercise of different kinds of reasoning, and the trainability of T2 
rational thinking dispositions. Behavior is seen as a complex function of the two 
systems or types reasoning working in cooperation and competition with each 
other. The importance of T2 skills and dispositions for decision making is evident 
                                                                
31 Snow, Virtue as Social Intelligence, 37. 
32 Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick, “Representativeness Revisited,” in Heuristics and 
Biases, 49-81, 51. 
33 Stanovich, “Distinction,” 359. 
34 Epistemic and moral paternalism rather than character cultivation is appealing to Skeptics. 
Virtue theorists would reject this but could agree that there needs to be a balance between 
managing situations and acquiring virtue (inner/outer management). Of course, managing 
situations is partly the individual’s job, as the virtuous are often those that wisely avoid 
temptations, etc. they know they are susceptible to, rather than those who show outstanding 
continence or willpower.  
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from the way they monitor T1 responses and potentially correct for the biases that 
fast, intuitive processes are most vulnerable to. According to Evans,  
We actually know quite a lot, from the experiments conducted by psychologists, 
about when the reflective mind will intervene in decision-making. This will 
happen more often when people are given strong instructions for rational 
thinking, for example to engage in logical reasoning and disregard prior beliefs. 
There will be less intervention when people are given little time to think about 
the problem, or are required to carry out another task at the same time that 
requires their attention.35  
Stanovich puts much the same point by saying that “mindware gaps most often 
arise from lack of education and experience.”36  
I conclude that reliabilist VE is not substantially out of accord with DPT, 
either in terms of individual differences as anticipated and found in test results on 
heuristics tasks, or in terms of their explanation. The cautious optimism that 
character epistemology shares with moderate Meliorist social psychology supports 
the possibilities of substantially improving education for individual rational 
thinking dispositions. It therefore finds quite congenial the argument that grounds 
this possibility empirically in the basic distinction between largely innate IQ and 
largely acquired intellectual habits and skills. Dual process theory can help 
philosophers address the question of credit worthiness for success of heuristic 
strategies and T1 processes. At the same time, DPT allows us to reject Alfano’s 
dilemma regarding VE and inferential knowledge as based upon the false 
dichotomy, the forced choice between treating heuristics en toto as either virtuous 
or non-virtuous. Finally, together with the other considerations we have raised, it 
reveals his first key thesis, (ICS), as a generalization based upon that false 
dichotomy (i.e., a principle fallaciously claiming that people employ heuristics 
‘rather than’ manifesting reliabilist virtues). The next section turns attention to 
studies that Alfano uses from social psychology to support a substantially different 
challenge, one aimed at responsibilist and inquiry-focused forms of VE. 
3. Responsibility, Reflective Virtues, and Social Environment 
When situationists criticize ‘classical’ (neo-Aristotelian) and ‘inquiry-focused’ 
(Peircean/Deweyan) virtue responsibilism as empirically inadequate, they 
naturally enough utilize studies from social psychology.37 The previous section on 
                                                                
35 Evans, Thinking Twice, 205.  
36 Stanovich, “Distinction,” 356. 
37 John Dewey was very concerned not just in formal reasoning, but in how we think. His 
account of habit is highly attentive to the philosophical importance of entrenched aspects of our 
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Alfano’s dilemma for virtue reliabilists was cast in terms of epistemic credit 
restricted to achievement of epistemic goods through an individual’s ability, but 
Alfano’s suggestion is especially pertinent to testimonial knowledge and to 
discussion of reflective intellectual virtues like intellectual courage, humility, and 
trust.  
One proposal I appreciate in Alfano’s Character as Moral Fiction is a need to 
move away from treating individuals as the bearers of virtue, to thinking of them 
as “a triadic relation among the agent, a social milieu, and an environment.”38 But 
apart from the attempts by some thinkers to put demanding intellectual 
motivation conditions on knowledge,39 the suggestion to conceive reflective 
virtues in this ‘triadic’ way could be related to a wealth of recent work among 
responsibilists on collective and group virtues, and beyond this to strong overlaps 
one finds among character epistemology, social epistemology, and feminist 
epistemology today.40 As inquiry-focused VE does not partake of what Alfano 
describes as Linda Zagzebski’s ‘classical responsibilism,’ I will not defend her 
conditions on knowing.41 We will instead attend to Alfano’s more general claim 
that “the intellectual virtues traditionally countenanced by classical responsibilism 
                                                                                                                                       
cognitive architecture, as well as situational factors within our environment. Habit is the fixed 
routine of activity which normally predominates, often manifesting in behavior in which 
consciousness may play only a token role. He states that people often know more with their 
habits, not with their consciousness; Action may take place with or without an end-in-view, 
and in the latter case, there is simply settled habit. It is only if a problematic situation arises that 
habit is disrupted and impulse proves inadequate. At this point, if we have the needed flexibility 
and metacognitive wherewithal, more effortful thinking intervenes to help resolve the 
problematic situation, or it does not, and the result is likely to be unsatisfactory. The 
adjustments are only successful as we have the flexibility of mind to apply a strategy of inquiry 
well-adapted to the particular situation.  
38 Alfano, Virtue and Moral Fiction, 146. 
39 Brendel distinguishes between holding that virtues that function as means of acquiring 
knowledge are rightly described as dispositions, and the attempt to define knowledge in terms 
of these virtuous dispositions. I agree with her description of Linda Zagzebski’s form of virtue 
responsibilism as leading to ‘a counter – intuitive and intellectually over-loaded concept of 
knowledge.’ See Elke Brendel, “The Epistemic Function of Virtuous Dispositions,” in Debating 
Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, eds. Gregor 
Damschen, Robert Schnepf, and Karsten Stüber (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014). I have elsewhere 
described inquiry-focused VE as holding an ‘overlap’ model of ethical and intellectual norms, in 
contrast to Linda Zagzebski’s ‘reduction’ model. Alfano seems to mean something else by 
inquiry-focused VE than I do. 
40 Work on civic and collective/group virtues and on theory virtues in science apply aretaic 
concepts without supposing these to be personal traits. 
41 Linda Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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and inquiry responsible are empirically inadequate.”42 The support he offers for 
this empirical inadequacy charge is the force of the thesis he calls Epistemic 
Situationism (ES): 
(ES) Most people’s conative intellectual traits are not virtues because they are 
highly sensitive to seemingly trivial and epistemically irrelevant situational 
influences.43  
Alfano’s key theses (ICS) and (ES) are broad generalizations that are 
purported scientific conclusions from psychological experiments. The main studies 
that Alfano uses to support his generalization (ES) are the famous Asch Line Task 
studies of the early 1950’s, and its follow-ups. Staying with the approach of strong 
empirical rebuttal, I now want to show that Alfano’s use of the Line Task studies 
depends upon a misleading re-interpretation of them. They do not strongly 
support the lesson he wants and needs to draw from them. Firstly, Alfano does not 
mention that the original Asch studies on conformity took place on American 
subjects exclusively, and during the McCarthy Era when lack of conformity was 
often identified with lack of patriotism and socially ostracized on that basis. 
Alfano’s interpretation of the results of these studies is furthermore substantially 
at odds with the experimenters’ own conclusions. I will now argue that his 
interpretation is at odds with their own statements both about the variability of 
responses found on the Line Task, and about the explanations of these differences 
in response, where Alfano blatantly ignores Asch’s and Milgram’s explanation 
involving cultural variances.  
 
Variability of responses: Asch did conclude that a majority can influence a 
minority even in an unambiguous situation in which the correct answer is 
obvious, confirming (versus M. Sherif) that majority influence is stronger than had 
been thought. But he saw the studies as clearly showing that people are capable of 
greater or lesser ‘strength’ in resisting peer pressure. “Among the independent 
individuals were many who held fast because of staunch confidence in their own 
judgment.”44 What Asch and his colleagues found to be ‘the most significant fact’ 
                                                                
42 Alfano, Virtue as Moral Fiction, 185. 
43 Alfano, Virtue as Moral Fiction, 162. See also Alfano’s earlier “Expanding the Situationist 
Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology, Philosophical Quarterly 62, 247 (2012): 223-
249.  
44 Quotations taken from S. E. Asch, “Opinions and Social Pressure,” Scientific American 193, 5 
(1955): 31-35. Retrieved July 5, 2016, from http://www.columbia.edu/cu/psychology/terrace 
/w1001/readings/asch.pdf. In a later publication, Asch does again say that “errors increased 
strikingly” among subjects as majority increased, this being measured against control group. Yet 
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about the fully 25% best-performers who were consistently independent “was not 
absence of responsiveness to the majority but a capacity to recover from doubt and 
to reestablish their equilibrium.” They also found that the degree of independence 
increases with the deviation of the majority from the truth and with “decreased 
clarity in a situation.” They held that the study “establishes conclusively that the 
performances of individual subjects were highly consistent”: those who showed 
independence from or conformity with a majority over which of three presented 
lines was longest continued the same pattern of response over time. This last 
conclusion from the data deserves special mention since it seems quite 
inconsistent with the claim of (ES) that most people are highly sensitive to 
situational variables.45  
What degree of independence is needed to demonstrate significant 
individual differences is a matter of much dispute among psychologists, but 
Alfano’s exclusive emphasis on the degree of conformity relative to a control 
group not exposed to peer pressure presents a one-sided reading, substantially at 
odds with Asch’s own conclusions emphasizing very substantial individual 
differences in motivation or ability to resist peer pressure, and high individual 
consistency over time. Alfano emphasizes that unanimity among confederates 
‘produced striking conformity’46 in test subjects, while Asch himself emphasizes 
‘startling differences’ and strong ‘consistency’ among these same subjects. Neither 
insight is strictly wrong, but neither one is the whole story. 
 
Explanation of the data: Foremost among questions that Asch says his studies raise 
is the question of the extent to which these ‘startling differences’ can be attributed 
to ‘sociological or cultural conditions.’ Asch concluded by suggesting that cultural 
values are among the primary explainers, and that  
the tendency to conformity in our society…raises questions about our ways of 
education and about the values that guide our conduct…anyone inclined to draw 
                                                                                                                                       
he also concludes that “Individuals responded in fundamentally different ways to the opposition 
of the majority,” and that “Despite the effect of the majority the preponderance of estimates 
was, under the present conditions, independent of the majority.” (“Studies of Independence and 
Conformity: A Minority of One against a Unanimous Majority,” Psychological Monographs: 
General and Applied 70 (1956): 1-70, DOI: 10.1037/h0093718. Retrieved March 24, 2016, 
from http://psyc604.stasson.org/Asch1956.pdf (12).) Note also that if the line task is a ‘rapid 
response’ task, recent DPT research predicts that this ‘taxing’ effect on subjects will result in 
lowered performance, even independently of the ‘majority effect’ that Alfano tries to say 
undermines the robustness of intellectual courage as a character trait. 
45 Asch, “Studies,” 20. 
46 Alfano, Virtue as Moral Fiction, 183.  
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too pessimistic conclusions from this report would do well to remind himself that 
the capacities for independence are not to be underestimated.47  
Stanley Milgram in 1961 conducted follow-up comparative studies in part 
to see if Asch was right about cultural values deeply impacting response to peer 
pressure. Comparing French and Norwegian subjects, he found the hypothesis of 
cultural variation to be corroborated by his study. While his conclusions were 
phrased tentatively (“These findings are by no means conclusive”), he reported 
that “No matter how the data are examined they point to greater independence 
among the French than among the Norwegians.” Yet when Alfano does mention 
Milgram’s “Nationality and Conformity,” he leaves its guiding hypothesis of 
cultural variation totally out of his presentation, instead re-interpreting this study 
in a self-serving way as just re-confirming a lesson about humans taken 
collectively: that character-traits are routinely swamped by epistemically-
irrelevant situational variables like majority effect. So he writes that “As in the 
original Asch study, unanimity produced striking conformity.” But while Alfano 
cites situational factors like majority size as salient, Milgram’s own conclusion 
actually highlighted the salience of cultural influences supported by the finding 
that “in every one of the five experiments performed in both countries the French 
showed themselves to be the more resistant to group pressure.”48 The situationist 
interpretation of Line Task studies fails to account for the importance of cultural 
influence on conformity, as tested across time (Americans in the Fifties vs. the 
Sixties, say), or across cultures (French versus Norwegians). Alfano also omits any 
mention of the prominent 1996 meta-study of Asch-type line judgment tasks, 
which actually drew upon 133 studies in 17 countries. The Bond and Smith meta-
study found that “levels of conformity had steadily declined since Asch’s studies in 
the early 1950s”; in respect to just the U.S. studies it found “that the date of study 
was significantly negatively related to effect size, indicating that there has been a 
                                                                
47 Asch, “Opinions,” 34: “At one extreme, about one quarter of the subjects were completely 
independent and never agreed with the erroneous judgments of the majority. At the other 
extreme, some individuals went with the majority nearly all the time.”  
48 “Twelve per cent of the Norwegian students conformed to the group on every one of the 16 
critical trials, while only 1 per cent of the French conformed on every occasion. Forty-one per 
cent of the French students but only 25 per cent of the Norwegians displayed strong 
independence. And in every one of the five experiments performed in both countries the 
French showed themselves to be the more resistant to group pressure.” (Stanley Milgram, 
“Nationality and Conformity, Scientific American 205, 6 (1961). Retrieved July 3, 2016      
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=milgram-nationality-conformity&print= 
true.) 
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decline in the level of conformity.”49 The section comparing national and national 
trans-national studies concluded that  
the impact of the cultural variables was greater than any other, including those 
moderator variables such as majority size typically identified as being important 
factors. Cultural values, it would seem, are significant mediators of response in 
group pressure experiments. 
Here again, what these (non-situationist) authors conclude to be the variable 
whose impact on task response was ‘greater than any other’ is allowed no 
significant role in the situationist re-interpretation of these same studies. 
These are all reasons to think that the Asch Line Task studies do not provide 
the evidence needed to make Alfano’s thesis (ES) a strong generalization from 
social psychological experiments. We should for the same reasons of weak 
empirical support reject Alfano’s associated claims that “virtues identified by 
inquiry responsibilism are not the sorts of traits that many people possess,” and 
that “rather than being intellectually courageous, people are at best intellectually 
courageous unless faced with unanimous dissent of at least three other people.” It 
appears that theoretical orientation deeply affects the interpretation that 
situationists like Alfano apply to the studies they cite and discuss. Add to this that 
the studies they cite are highly selective and often quite dated ones pulled from a 
much larger literature on biases and heuristics. Both points greatly diminish the 
support these studies can provide to the situationist’s generalizations about human 
behavior.  
To digress for a moment, one point that critics have made against 
behaviorist and situationist methodology is that individual differences in 
personality or character-related effects routinely get ‘construed as noise’ and 
therefore deprived of due consideration.50 Recognition of quite significant 
                                                                
49 Rod Bond and Peter Smith, “Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of Studies Using 
Asch's Line Judgment Task,” Psychological Bulletin 119, 1 (1996): 111-137, 124-125, 
http://psycnet.apa.org/?&fa=main.doiLanding&doi=10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.111. 
50 John Kihlstrom argues that understood historically, it is because of what situationism inherits 
from behaviorism that situationists are predisposed to interpret social psychological studies 
largely in terms of behavioral reflexes upon a set human nature, or less strongly, in terms of 
social behavior varying as a function of features of the external environment. Kihlstrom 
observes that “In such research, the effects of individual differences in personality are generally 
construed as ‘noise.’ This view is captured by what might be called the Doctrine of Situationism: 
‘Social behavior varies as a function of features of the external environment, particularly the 
social situation, that elicit behavior directly, or that communicate social expectations, demands, 
and incentives’…. Situationism has its obvious origins in stimulus-response behaviorism.” (John 
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differences in performance, whether attributable more to individual or to cultural 
character, threatens their conception of human nature as varying largely only as a 
function of features of the external environment. Alfano for his part calls it a 
bogeyman to identify situationists with a crude behavioristic model of conduct; he 
claims that it holds appropriate place for deliberation and sensitivity to reasons in 
the determination of conduct in an agent. But that Alfano ‘blinks’ over all matters 
related to the salience of cultural values in the explanation of differences in 
response among test subjects suggests otherwise. I argue that it clearly shows an 
inadequate acknowledgment of social milieu, and in this sense betrays their 
avowed interactionist, triadic relationship between agent, social milieu, and 
environment. To cross the line between social and cognitive psychology for a 
moment, we earlier discussed DPT as defending the reality and importance of 
individual differences (Section 2, above). But the role of cultural values in 
explaining the variability of responses is easily accommodated and indeed 
supported in DPT. As Manktelow summarizes in Thinking and Reasoning, studies 
affirm that the new mind is more heavily influenced by culture and formal 
education. In Stanovich’s terms, people can acquire new ‘mindware,’ and the 
mindware that people employ is influenced by their culture. 
Concern with interpretations of social psychological experiments that 
ignore the impact of cultural values on task performance highlights the fact that 
the situationist generalization draws upon a base of mostly latitudinal or ‘single 
pass’ studies. The lessons that must be learned between psychology and 
philosophy, this should remind us, run both directions. Methodologies that 
purport to draw broad generalizations but are based mainly on single-pass 
heuristic task studies seem to me as open to critique as are studies of moral 
reasoning narrowly dependent upon intuition-pumping and ‘Trolley-ology,’ or 
traumatic, dilemma-focused tests. Philosophers and psychologists have both been 
at fault, and only working together will philosophers and psychologists better 
address the Descriptive-Normative Gap problem introduced at the start of this 
paper. But before discussing that problem directly in the final section, let me say 
more about virtue epistemologies themselves, and different forms of they take, 
since everyone agrees that the situationist challenge affects different forms of VE 
differently, and some more strongly than others.51 
                                                                                                                                       
F. Kihlstrom, “The Person-Situation Interaction,” in Oxford Handbook of Social Cognition, ed. 
Donal E. Carlston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2-3.)  
51 I am taking ‘credit theory’ broadly enough to include both Robust (RVE) and anti-Luck 
(ALVE) virtue epistemologies. Responsibilist and inquiry-focused VE cut across Jason Baehr’s 
distinction between autonomous and conservative VE; Inquiry-focused VE may still offer an 
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Robust, global character-traits and the responsibilist forms of VE that are 
most concerned with these ‘thick’ characterological and affective concepts are a 
natural first target of situationist critique. I think of the specific form of VE I 
support – inquiry-focused VE, or as I have sometimes also termed it, zetetic 
responsibilism in contrast with Zagzebski’s phronomic responsibilism – as 
champion of things diachronic. This means it supports and investigates both the 
backwards-looking concern with the etiology of particular belief, and forward-
looking – let us call this axiological – concern with the need to reflect upon or 
improve one’s cognitive strategy and/or evidential situation and to fit one’s 
epistemic goals, etc.52 The first is a primary matter for virtue reliabilists and any 
account of doxastic justification; the second is a concern for both reliabilists and 
responsibilists, but is not closely connected with epistemic assessment or the 
project of the analysis of knowledge.  
There is a close if not perfect connection between philosophical concern 
with the diachronic as crucial to both ethical and epistemic normativity, and 
dissatisfaction with situationist social psychology as generalizing latitudinal 
studies. There is no dearth of longitudinal studies, but much of it exists over the 
gap between situationist and automaticity theory, on the one hand, and positive 
psychology on the other. Blaine Fowers and his colleagues for example try to 
operationalize Aristotelian virtue theory. It is not incidental to this that in his 
book Psychology and Virtue, Fowers argues that taking latitudinal studies as a 
basis for ‘judging timelessly’ is highly problematic. If humans don’t just encounter, 
but also help construct their environments, then situational and agential factors 
are not as easily sorted out as it might appear when we draw only from latitudinal 
studies.  
If we are serious about exploring whether character strengths actually manifest 
in behavior, a very different approach to the research [than latitudinal studies 
take] is necessary. Investigators have to assess three essential components of a 
trait or character strength. First, there must be individual differences on the 
                                                                                                                                       
account of knowing even while re-envisioning epistemology in the Deweyan fashion of theory 
of inquiry. For opposing views on whether virtue epistemologies really build more empirical 
assumptions into their accounts than do other, more generic forms of reliabilist externalism see 
David Henderson and Terrance Horgan, “Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions,” in 
Debating Dispositions, 296-319. Also Christian Nimtz, “Knowledge, Abilities, and ‘Because’-
Clauses,” in Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, eds. Tim 
Henning and David P. Schweikard (London: Routledge, 2013). 
52 See Guy Axtell, “Recovering Responsibility,” Logos & Episteme II, 3 (2011): 429-454 for 
defense of the epistemic centrality of diachronic and not just synchronic evaluations, as 
internalist evidentialists insist.  
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characteristic. Second, evidence for consistency in trait-associated behaviors is 
needed across situations. Third, there must be consistency in trait-associated 
behavior over time.53  
Connecting with Fowers second and third point, Jesse Prinz points out that 
“Factors external to a person can influence behavior in two different ways: 
synchronically or diachronically,” but that latitudinal studies largely capture only 
synchronic influence.54  I find each of these distinctions especially pertinent to the 
prospects of tying philosophy and the social sciences closer together. For example, 
sociologist Gabriel Abend argues that if the contemporary science of morality 
focuses on situations or courses of action judged as ‘right,’ ‘okay,’ or ‘permissible,’ 
recorded through the push of a button, then it “is not a science of morality, but of 
thin morality only.” Much as social scientists are rightly skeptical of philosophical 
ethics presented as dilemma-cases and Trolley-problems, virtue theorists are 
skeptical of a long tradition in social psychology focused on a ‘thin’ conception of 
moral and cognitive reasoning.55  
We can end this section with a passage from Prinz, who argues that the 
difference between synchronic and diachronic influence matters vitally, because 
the two forms of influence hold quite different theoretical lessons and 
implications: 
If we were swayed only by synchronic factors, then all people would be the 
same: put two people in the same situation, and they will probably do the same 
thing. But, if diachronic influences are possible, then people can internalize 
social norms, and, as a result, people with different backgrounds will behave 
differently in the exact same situations. If all people behaved alike in the same 
situations, character based ethical theories would be in trouble: it would be 
impossible to cultivate character. At best, we could do what Doris recommends: 
try to put ourselves in situations that promote good behavior. But, if diachronic 
influence is possible, the cultivation of character is possible… Cultivating 
                                                                
53 Blaine Fowers, Virtue and Psychology: Pursuing Excellence in Ordinary Practices 
(Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 2005), 40. 
54 Jesse Prinz, “The Normativity Challenge: Why Empirically Real Traits Won’t Save Virtue 
Ethics,” Journal of Ethics 13 (2009): 117-144, 132.  
55 I have sometimes described my fellow virtue responsibilists as epistemological ‘thickies.’ 
Abend points out that “Unlike thin predicates, thick predicates have institutional and cultural 
preconditions or presuppositions … [T]he moral concepts and properties expressed by those 
predicates – e.g., the concepts and properties of humanness, gentlemanliness, piousness – are 
partly constituted by institutional and cultural facts.” (Gabriel Abend, "Thick Concepts and the 
Moral Brain,” Archive of European Sociology LII (2011): 143-172.) For a thin-centered account, 
see Thomas Hurka, “Virtuous Act, Virtuous Disposition, Analysis 66, 1 (2006): 69-76. 
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virtuous traits that do not get overwhelmed by synchronic situational variables 
may be difficult, but there is no reason to think it’s impossible.56  
4. The Normative-Descriptive Gap and the Olin/Doris ‘Trade-off’ Thesis 
According to Olin and Doris in their “Vicious Minds” paper (2013), it is “insofar as 
reliability is a condition on epistemic virtue” that we have reason to doubt that 
human organisms possess such virtue. The unreliability of agents follows from lack 
of ‘stable’ dispositions, due to our enormous vulnerability to irrelevant context 
effects. In order to formalize their challenge to VE they present the following 
dilemma involving a forced trade-off: 
[V]irtue epistemologists encounter a dilemma: they can either formulate their 
theories to successfully accommodate the empirical challenge and lose the 
normative appeal derived from virtue ethics, or retain the normative appeal 
derived from virtue ethics and fall prey to the empirical challenge.57 
We can call this the trade-off problem, because it is based on a thesis about 
a forced option between maintaining normative appeal and empirical adequacy. 
An embedded assumption I want to focus on is the trade-off thesis:  
pressures on theory building in virtue epistemology are hydraulic: increase 
empirical adequacy at the expense of normative appeal, or increase normative 
appeal at the expense of empirical adequacy.58 
Olin and Doris argue that virtue epistemology seems skepticism-inviting, 
but notice first that if the challenge to agent-reliability affects externalist and 
internalist epistemologies both, it may be that their own view is the one that 
invites skepticism. At least they say nothing to indicate what conditions would set 
a reasonable bar so that knowledge is not fleetingly rare. It looks like our modes of 
belief production on the vicious mind thesis are neither safe nor sensitive, so an 
analysis of knowledge involving tracking conditions or other sorts of counter-
factuals may not pass muster either.59 But more charitably we can take their 
                                                                
56 Prinz, “The Normativity Challenge,” 132. 
57 Lauren Olin and John Doris, “Vicious Minds,” Philosophical Studies 168, 3 (2013): 665-692. 
58 Olin and Doris, “Vicious Minds,” 32. 
59 It is hard to separate these issues of skepticism and anti-skepticism from concern with 
epistemic luck, which the authors do not mention; the distinction between Robust (RVE) an 
Anti-luck virtue epistemologies (ALVE) is quite as pertinent as the distinction between virtue 
reliabilists and responsibilists (and maybe more so, if the latter is largely a matter of emphasis 
and any VE must account for both knowledge-constitutive and auxiliary virtues). But luck isn’t 
treated in Olin and Doris’s paper. Since I am interested in virtue-theoretic responses to 
skepticism, I would argue for the advantages that allowing ALVE’s independent anti-luck 
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concerns as focusing on credit theories, and more specifically on problems with an 
aretaic condition, including its best-known formulations in terms of a 
dispositional condition (Sosa) or an explanatory ‘because’ (Greco; Zagzebski).  
Like Alfano, Olin and Doris do acknowledge my earlier comparison 
between the generality problem in epistemology and the situationist challenge to 
character-traits.60 While they write that they “are sympathetic to the observation 
that the search for virtues and the search for reliable belief-forming process types 
may be partly coextensive,” they deny my argument that this attenuates the 
situationist challenge to the credit theory; they anyway find humans to be without 
many stable belief-forming process types. Since my claim of partial co-extension is 
granted but Olin and Doris do not comment on how I try to resolve this problem 
with aNarrow-Broad Spectrum of Agency-Ascriptions [Table 4], I will use this 
opportunity to provide a fuller development of how a properly modeled spectrum 
of agency-ascriptions assuages the concerns that Olin and Doris raise.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
condition has over RVE attempts to have a single aretaic condition serve to deal with both the 
value problem and the epistemic luck problem. In addition to this key advantage I have 
elsewhere argue for, ALVE affords us a substantially smaller ‘empirical footprint’ than RVE. I 
cannot here explain my ‘smaller empirical footprint of anti-luck VE relative to Robust VE’ 
claim, but see Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, “The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue 
Epistemology,” in Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, eds. Ruth 
Groff and John Greco (London: Routledge, 2012), 248-269 and “Robust Virtue Epistemology and 
Epistemic Anti-Individualism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93, 1 (2012): 84-103 on 
advantages of ALVE (sometimes called ‘Weak VE’) in accounting for veritic luck cases especially 
in regard to what they term epistemic dependence, and the implausibility of any version of VE 
that cannot account for it. Pritchard also recognizes a spectrum of weak and strong epistemic 
achievements, where in many instances one can meet the rubric for cognitive achievements 
pretty easily, while in other instances the agent must overcome a significant obstacle to 
cognitive success, or manifest high levels of cognitive skill. See Guy Axtell, “Felix Culpa: Luck in 
Ethics and Epistemology,” Metaphilosophy 34, 3 (2003): 331-352; and “Two for the Show: Anti-
Luck and Virtue Epistemologies in Consonance,” Synthese 158, 3 (2007): 363-383, for my first 
forays into a version of ALVE, which I ironically proposed in responding to Pritchard’s early 
Robust Anti-luck epistemology (RAL), the position he took in this first book, Epistemic Luck 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
60 Olin and Doris, "Vicious Minds," note 16. 
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Table 4:  The Narrow – Broad Spectrum of Agency-Ascriptions61 
Narrowly-typed Abilities (NTA)                    Broadly-typed Abilities (BTA) 
 
— Low-level virtues (faculty virtues). 
Dispositions construed as genetically-
endowed abilities or cognitive 
capacities.  
 
—Best suited to evaluating the etiology of a 
single belief or narrow range of beliefs;  
 
 
—Their ascription is often keyed to doxastic 
justification of particular beliefs 
actually held by an agent. 
 
 
 
—Their ascription answers to the Generality 
Problem by fixing the “narrowest, 
content-neutral process that is 
operative in belief production” for an 
actually held belief. 62  
 
 
— The value of low-level virtues is 
transmitted directly to their products 
and only indirectly to the agents who 
have them. 
 
— High-level virtues (reflective virtues). Best 
suited to tell about the agent’s abilities and 
practices in a certain domain/area. 
  
— Best suited to holistic evaluation of agents, 
including the quality of their activities of 
inquiry.  
 
—Their ascription is not primarily to doxastic 
justification of particular beliefs. Their 
ascription is not to the ideology of 
‘processes,’ but to the axiology of inquiry or 
‘ideal-types.’ 
 
—Their ascription is primarily occurrent, 
describing personal habits or counter-factual 
states of motivation an agent who performs a 
certain act-type in the given situation (and 
ethically or intellectually virtuous agent) 
would have.  
 
— The value of high-level virtues attaches directly 
to their possessor but only tenuously to their 
products. 
 
 
To develop the role of this N-B Spectrum in responding to the dilemma, I 
first want to distinguish between two senses of the trade-off thesis that drives Olin 
and Doris’ dilemma, replying to each sense in turn. The formal sense of the trade-
off thesis indicates a general trade-off between pursuing normative assessment and 
pursuing descriptive adequacy. The substantive sense makes as I understand it a 
stronger and more directed claim: Proponents of an aretaic or person-level ability 
                                                                
61 See also Lepock “Unifying the Intellectual Virtues,” from which my present chart and that of 
Axtell, “Character Trait Ascriptions,” draws many key points. Thanks to Christopher for 
discussion of his distinction and chart.  
62 Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 
363. 
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condition face an especially difficult or dire version of this problem (relative to 
other (unspecified) potentially successful anti-skeptical epistemologies). They 
force this problem because whenever an aretaic condition is formulated so as to be 
empirically adequate (psychologically realizable) it will turn out to lack normative 
appeal, and whenever such a condition is formulated to have strong normative 
appeal, it will turn out to be empirically inadequate (psychologically unrealizable). 
The formal sense of the trade-off thesis is a general warning about 
conflating explanatory and normative posits; if this is correct, it is largely a matter 
of logic. In response to this formal sense of the ‘trade-off’ problem, the Narrow-
Broad Spectrum distinguishes different ways of ascribing epistemic agency to 
people. This formal sense makes no great worry for normative epistemologies 
because it is already acknowledged by the distinctions that the spectrum uses to 
avoid conflations that otherwise occur. Allowing that agency ascriptions serve a 
variety of purposes, as our spectrum does, means that what has the most empirical 
content need not have much normative appeal, and what has the most normative 
appeal need not have much empirical skin in the game.  
The formal sense of the trade-off thesis locates it on the familiar grounds of 
the normative-descriptive gap. In so saying, however, familiar resources for 
responding also come to mind. The dilemma reflects the much-discussed and 
troublesome relationship between the normative appeal of unbounded rationality, 
with standards that ignore time, information, and computation of agents, and 
bounded rationality, where the scientific image, the real world, rushes back in. 
That we will be forced to judge humans as broadly irrational if we judge 
rationality by an ‘Enlightenment picture’ of unbounded agency when this is 
untrue of our actual way of being in the world, has been a common argument in 
the great rationality debate.63 This is a rubbing point between N-theories and 
ecological rationality. But virtue epistemologies are not committed to any 
particular view on these broad issues. For them the formal sense of our dilemma 
just seems to be this well-known problem, re-directed towards conditions on 
knowledge rather than on rationality. There always is and needs to be a contrast of 
performance with competence, but standards of competence that arise entirely 
independently of psychology from ideals of pure logic or ideal agency, may lead us 
to doubt human competence universally.  
Responding to the substantive sense of the ‘trade-off’ thesis is where our 
real work lies. Here there is more than a general warning, but a real risk of ‘costs,’ 
                                                                
63 See David Matheson, “Bounded Rationality, Epistemic Externalism and the Enlightenment 
Picture of Cognitive Virtue,” in Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, ed. Robert J. 
Stainton (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 134-144. 
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in the present case to a credit theory of knowing. If we cannot say how and why 
this theory can avoid such conflations, or explain what legitimate epistemic 
concerns broadly-typed reflective virtues serve in an analysis of knowledge except 
to be causal – explanatory posits, then the theory looks to be in trouble. This 
requires a more detailed exposition of our spectrum. Responding to the 
substantive sense of the trade-off thesis requires making several further 
distinctions, including especially that between epistemological concerns with the 
etiology of belief (also called doxastic justification or ex post justification), on the 
one hand, and epistemological axiology together with norms of agential 
rationality/responsibility on the other.  
At the Narrow end of the spectrum lie ascriptions of particular mental 
faculties and strategies, and at the Broad end lie more ‘occurrent’ ascriptions 
associated with agency under normal or ideal circumstances. It is only NT traits 
that directly address the generality problem, and hence doxastic justification, the 
core question of an account of knowing on all but purely internalist 
epistemologies.64 This point basically follows from the normal reliabilist line on 
the generality problem, which is that the pertinent process-type to try to specify 
for doxastic justification is the “narrowest, content-neutral process that is 
operative in belief production.”65 NT traits are best ascribed to a particular belief of 
an agent, to reconstruct its reliable etiology in a way that excludes all but modally 
remote error-possibilities. Agency ascriptions serving this etiological function, we 
can see, simply don’t require much normative ‘appeal,’ at least on the fairly 
minimal account of credit we discussed in connection with DPT in section 2. 
On the other hand, the Broad end of the spectrum is directly concerned 
with praise; it is high praise, but does not in the same way entail epistemic credit, 
since there are plenty of ways to be personally justified (to be both synchronically 
rational as the evidentialist demands, and diachronically rational in our zetetic 
activities as the virtues would guide us to be), yet still come out with a false belief, 
or with a true belief not related in the right way to the agent’s ability, as in Gettier 
cases. Thus, if by attacking the ‘empirical adequacy’ of BT attributions Olin and 
Doris are assuming that such attributions always imply some robust disposition, 
this is simply mistaken. BT (broadly-typed) virtues are typically ascribed in 
assessment of an agent’s actions-at-inquiry – what I call zetetic activities – rather 
than in order to credit an agent for coming to have a particular a non-luckily true 
                                                                
64 I do agree with some criticisms of a methodological individualist conception of knowledge, 
and I take VE to have strong overlaps with social epistemologists. 
65 See Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, 363.  
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belief.66 The ‘normative appeal’ of agency ascriptions and descriptions of the BT 
kind, I will need to argue, does not require them to have much empirical 
exposure. Since broad reflective virtues do not consist in a single neurological state 
of a person, that personal’s behavior may be our best or only overt reason for 
ascribing such a dispositional property to them. The personal praise for broadly-
typed virtues can be dispositional or occurrent. Occurrent attributions associate an 
agent with actions a virtuous or vicious agent would perform, or with motives 
they would have. We can call them occurrent because these kinds of 
counterfactuals demand only conformity with norms, and on the present view, are 
substantially weaker than causal-explanatory attributions.  
Here we bump up against one of the major differences between ‘inquiry-
focused’ VE and ‘classical’ responsibilism. I agree entirely with Olin and Doris’ 
point that ‘mixed’ accounts need to be careful what reliability and responsibility 
conditions are accepted and how they are framed. Inquiry-focused VE argues that 
intellectual virtues thought of as character-traits make us good at inquiry, but they 
contribute to a formal account of knowledge only in indirect ways. Hookway 
rightly notes that “Virtues regulate inquiries and deliberations, and only indirectly 
regulate beliefs.”67 Since habits of mind acknowledged as intellectual virtues are 
rather abstract and complex traits, they accordingly have “a broad variety of 
possible manifestations in the intellectual activities.”68 The motivations of 
reflectively virtuous inquirers normally do not regularly predict anything very 
specific by way of beliefs or activities.  
It is clear that occurrent attributions needn’t be explanatory in the way that 
dispositional ones are, that the normativity of epistemic assessment and doxastic 
guidance differ substantially, and that the third-personal concerns with the 
etiology of belief (that the project of analysis requires) should be clearly 
distinguished from the first-personal concerns of the inquirer, which norm to 
what her epistemic community identifies and values as theoretical and/or personal 
virtues. What is less well-recognized is that virtue theories in ethics and 
epistemology can easily accommodate a narrow/broad, or causal-
explanatory/normative spectrum of agency ascriptions, where posits at the 
                                                                
66 Alfano, Character as Moral Fiction, 171, allows responsibilisms that “stand as a purely 
normative theory” without ‘explanatory-cum-evaluative’ ambitions. But this is in tension with 
claims he also makes that even Autonomous VE as Baehr defines it has conditions of 
realizability for virtues that it cannot meet. This may be a problem of semantics over what is 
designated by ‘character-traits.’  
67 Christopher Hookway “How to be a Virtue Epistemologist,” in Intellectual Virtue, eds. 
Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 183-202, 197. 
68 Elke Brendel, “Function of Virtuous Dispositions,” 330. 
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different ends of the spectrum are recognized as serving substantially different 
albeit equally legitimate explanatory and evaluative functions. 
Given this, it also follows that we should carefully distinguish not only 
dispositional from occurrent attribution, but overlapping with it, epistemic credit 
from praise. The Narrow end of our spectrum is concerned with epistemic credit, 
but not necessarily praise, because it may not be fitting to praise or blame someone 
for faculty virtues or ‘automatic’ responses, however successfully employed. Thus, 
if by ‘normative appeal’ Olin and Doris mean praise and censure, then its absence 
in NT ascriptions on the present account comes at no real ‘expense.’  
In most cases the concerns with doxastic responsibility and other aspects of 
BT virtues should be carried on apart from the project of analysis of knowledge. 
This is the general lesson of the failure of internalist evidentialism, and of 
intellectualist conceptions of mind, more generally.69 Doxastic responsibility, like 
related concepts of rationality and personal justification, is taken as a generally 
necessary condition on knowledge only by more internalistically-oriented 
analyses. If one is going this route, the condition in question should be expressed 
negatively and occurrently, in the sense that meeting the condition merely means 
that the condition is met if we need not attribute to the agent motivations that an 
intellectually virtuous agent would not have, or actions or omissions that a 
virtuous agent would not perform or omit. Negative conditions on knowing (the 
agent’s motivations were not vicious or her actions and omissions were not 
irresponsible, for instance) obviously are judged in the way occurrent ascriptions 
are, not by actual global-trait manifestation). And, of course, the more externalist 
versions of VE are still more cautious about a right motivational condition on 
knowledge. The focus for reliabilist VE is doxastic justification, which is what the 
generality problem relates to. For externalists the broad end of the spectrum just is 
not ‘truth-linked’ in the way that doxastic justification is.70  
                                                                
69 See Axtell, “Recovering Responsibility.” 
70 That responsibility conditions can easily be included in a formal analysis as negative rather 
than positive conditions is something overlooked when ‘mixed’ epistemology is treated as the 
epistemic situationist do, as always just adding another contentious generally necessary 
condition on knowing. Knowledge-attributions arguably range from animal (‘brute’/externalist) 
to reflective (high-end/internalist) cognition. The beauty of negative conditions is that they 
allow sufficiency on knowledge in a plurality ways, and that they therefore fit with 'range 
concepts.' This is why situationism challenges Zagzebski’s RVE more than ALVE. Since what 
classical responsibilists really care about is conditions on ‘high-end’ or specifically reflective 
knowledge, this is better put in a negative way of saying that the agent is ‘not ill-motivated’ or 
that her efforts at inquiry and evidence-gathering were ‘not irresponsible,’ etc., than by a 
general necessary condition on knowledge. My account thus accords with and adds support to 
Thinking Twice about Virtue and Vice 
37 
Some proponents of VE like Zagzebski who view the relationship between 
epistemology and ethics to be tighter than I do, may disagree. For those who try to 
reduce epistemic to ethical evaluation, or to treat personal responsibility as 
equivalent to doxastic justification, I reiterate the demand for a more general 
separation between the theory of knowledge and accounts of personal justification 
(synchronic and diachronic rationality).71 We need to avoid the confusion of 
treating traits and states at the Broad end of the spectrum as doing the work of 
positive conditions on doxastic justification or knowledge, whose place is really 
with the generality problem and at the Narrow end. Critics of ‘classical 
responsibilism’ are probably right that trying to model epistemological 
normativity on ethical normativity (the neo-Aristotelian approach) contributes to 
these conflations.72  
Our distinction between the formal and substantive senses in which the 
trade-off thesis can be construed has directly informed our response to Olin and 
Doris’ dilemma for VE. If theory construction and VE is ‘hydraulic,’ as they 
contend, then is it any more so than for other philosophical analyses of 
knowledge, and if so, why? Even granting that it is more so and there is a 
substantive worry about virtue epistemologies in particular, it surely is unfair not 
to allow virtue epistemologists the fluidity and flexibility of a spectrum of agency 
ascriptions in order to clarify the specific functions and levels of empirical 
exposure presupposed in different kinds of agency ascriptions. When we do, I 
                                                                                                                                       
Kallestrup and Pritchard’s, which argues that ALVE fairs better on several dimensions, 
including empirical adequacy concerns, than does RVE. 
71 So consistent with my argument in “Recovering Responsibility,” that evidentialists like 
Feldman should accept the ‘separation,’ ‘divorce,’ or ‘two project’ proposal (that R. Foley and 
Anthony Booth persuasively argue for), I here place much the same demand upon phronomic 
virtue responsibilism. This result favors my more moderate stance of zetetic or inquiry-focused 
VE, which holds that reflective virtues are things that make us good at inquiry, and sometimes 
part of a rational reconstruction of belief acquisition or maintenance, but not for that reason a 
necessary condition on knowing.  
72 While I think avoiding these conflations is best addressed by inquiry-focused forms of VE, our 
account still agrees with Peter Samuelson and Ian Church when they write, “Presumably, any 
robust, full account of intellectual virtue will have to account for both cognitive faculty-virtues 
as well as character trait-virtues; whether one does this along agent-reliabilist lines or neo-
Aristotelian lines could be, to some extent, a matter of emphasis. For a person can hold a belief 
more strongly (or weakly) than warranted due to biases inherent in one’s cognitive systems, or 
due to some lack of character, just as a person can exhibit virtuous knowing via the proper 
functioning of one’s cognitive system or through the exercise of a virtuous character.” (Peter 
Samuelson and Ian Church, “When Cognition Turns Vicious: Heuristics and Biases in Light of 
Virtue Epistemology,” Philosophical Psychology 28, 8 (2014): 1095-1113.)  
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believe that VE has advantages over other epistemologies in helping us address the 
Normative-Descriptive Gap problem, which is just what philosophers and 
psychologists working together should want.  
A continuum or spectrum of agency-ascriptions helps to clarify what 
normative and explanatory concerns we have with different cases and different 
kinds of agency. But nothing we have said about agency ascriptions as they relate 
to knowledge possession implies the unreality of global and robust reflective 
virtues, or the idea that they are purely descriptive and never part of salient 
explanations for why we know. The reality of BT character – traits needn’t be 
called into question by acknowledging the spectrum’s range covering both 
dispositional and occurrent attributions. Being responsible is a great way to 
achieve epistemic goods like true belief, knowledge, and understanding. Indeed, 
without a lot of luck, this may be my only way, or at least my best shot at it. And 
the habits of responsible inquiry that I display today in coming to hold a true 
belief will, when an assessor retrospects on it tomorrow, be part of that belief's 
reconstructed etiology. But these contributions of responsibility to knowing still 
should not lead us to confuse etiology and axiology, or to think of personal 
justification (synchronic or diachronic) as guaranteeing these epistemic goods. 
Believing truly rather than falsely does not follow from my having unquestionable 
motives and giving my best cognitive effort. That is why Zagzebski’s ‘‘because’ 
condition is too strong, and why conforming to norms of motivation that a 
virtuous agent would have, or performing the inquiries a virtuous agent would 
perform, is generally sufficient to meet Broad-end norms associated with 
epistemic responsibility.  
To conclude, these concerns with the formal and substantive senses of the 
‘trade-off’ thesis are serious ones for virtue epistemologists, Olin and Doris are 
right to contend. But tying back to Section 2, DPT on my view also has the 
philosophical implication of supporting both the reality and value of global 
reflective virtues, moderating what can be claimed on empirical grounds about the 
modularity, or localness of character-traits, and the lack of robustness of traits of 
intellectual character. From a normative perspective, optimizing coordination of 
T1 and T2 within our natural limits is of crucial philosophical and pedagogical 
concern, especially since the parallel nature of T1 and T2 means they not only 
cooperate, but also both routinely operate at the same time and quite often 
compete in determining an agent's cognitive or ethical judgment.73 These latter 
                                                                
73 Compare Lisa Grover’s argument that “We should accept the psychological reality of narrow, 
localized character traits, while retaining the thick evaluative discourse required by virtue 
ethics….Thick global concepts are necessary for a theory of localized character traits and 
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facts about how we process make the metacognitive prowess that comes with 
acquiring rational thinking dispositions more necessary and more efficacious than 
they appear to be on either situationist or automaticity ('System 1’) theory. 
Habituating ourselves to rational thinking dispositions remains perhaps the most 
powerful tool within our adaptive toolbox.74 
                                                                                                                                       
situation management to make sense. Without evaluative integration of different local traits 
under thick evaluative concepts we cannot identify which local traits to develop, and which 
situations to seek out, or avoid.” (Lisa Grover, “The Evaluative Integration of Local Character 
Traits,” Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2012): 25-37, 36. 
74 Thanks to Mark Alfano, J. Adam Carter, Abrol Fairweather, Lauren Olin, John Doris, 
Anthony Booth, John Kihlstrom, Christopher Lepock, Christian Miller, and Holly Smith for 
comments and discussion. Lauren in particular provided a thoughtful and detailed set of 
comments on an early draft. 
